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JUDICIAL NOTICE
CHARLF-S V. LAUGHLIN*
The principle of judicial notice goes to the very essence of the
judicial process. Without a backlog of general knowledge, or the
power to make many summary determinations, any tribunal would
find the process of adjudication approaching impossibility. For a
principle so important judicial notice opens the door to little in the
way of crucial or controversial issues.
Judicial notice is covered by Uniform Rules 9 through 12.1 The
*Professor of Law, Washington and Lee Umversity.
1. Such portions of the Uniform Rules of Evidence (proposed by the
commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute) as
deal with judicial notice are as follows:
"RULE 9. Facts Which Must or May be Judicially Noticed.
"(1) Judicial notice shall be taken without request by a party, of the
common law, constitutions and public statutes in force in every state,
territory and jurisdiction of the United States, and of such specific facts
and propositions of generalized knowledge as are so universally known
that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute.
"(2) Judicial notice may be taken without request by a party, of (a)
private acts and resolutions of the Congress of the United States and of
the legislature of this state and duly enacted ordinances and duly pub-
lished regulations of governmental subdivisions or agencies of this state,
and (b) the laws of foreign countries, and (c) such facts as are so
generally known or of such common notoriety within the territorialjurisdiction of the court that they cannot reasonably be the subject
of dispute, and (d) specific facts and propositions of generalized knowl-
edge which are capable of immediate and accurate determination by re-
sort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.
"(3) Judicial notice shall be taken of each matter specified in para-
graph (2) of this rule if a party requests it and (a) fumishes the judge
sufficient information to enable him properly to comply with the request
and (b) has given each adverse party such notice as the judge may re-
quire to enable the adverse party to prepare to meet the request.
"RULE 10. Deternination as to Propriety of Judicial Notice and
Tenor of Matter Noticed.
"(1) The judge shall afford each party reasonable opportunity to
present to him information relevant to the propriety of taking judicial
notice of a matter or the tenor of the matter to be noticed.
"(2) In determining the propriety of taking judicial notice of a
matter or the tenor thereof, (a) the judge may consult and use any source
of pertinent information, whether or not furnished by a party, and (b)
no exclusionary rule except a valid claim of privilege shall apply.
"(3) If the information possessed by or readily available to thejudge, whether or not furnished by the parties, fails to convince him that
a matter falls dearly within Rule 9, or if it is insufficient to enable him
to notice the matter judicially, he shall decline to take judicial notice
thereof.
"(4) In any event the determination either by judicial notice or
from evidence of the applicability and the tenor of any matter of common
law, constitutional law, or of any statute, private act, resolution; ordinance
or regulation falling within Rule 9, shall be a matter for the judge and
not for the jury.
"RULE 11. Instructing the Trier of Fact as to Matter Judicially
Noticed. If a matter judicially noticed is other than the common law or
constitutions or public statutes of this state, the judge shall indicate for
the record the matter which is judicially noticed and if the matter would
otherwise have been for determination by a trier of fact other than the
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Minnesota statutory law upon that subject is not extensive. Chapter
5992 is entitled "Judicial Notice and Proof." Sections 599.01-599.03
and 599.11-599.25 deal with the subject of varying kinds of judicial
proof (some of which may have some indirect relationship to the
subject of judicial notice) , only sections 599.04-599.10 of that
chapter deal with judicial notice. Those sections correspond to the
Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act. In addition to the
seven mentioned sections of chapter 599, Minnesota has a consti-
tutional provision 3 requiring judicial notice of the provisions of
Municipal Home Rule Charters, and statutory provisions reqtuir-
ing the judicial notice of properly published rules and regulations of
administrative agencies, 4 municipal ordinances and local statutes,"
private statutes,6 the seal of any executive department of the United
States or of any corporation the stock of which is beneficially owned
by the United States, 7 and the seal and signature of the chairman
and secretary of the Industrial Commission.8
There are many Minnesota cases listed in the digest under the
heading of "Judicial Notice." In many, but not in all, the actual
words "judicial notice" were used by the courts. Most of these cases
do no more than state that such and such a matter will be judicially
noticed. Very few deal with judicial notice as a substitute for proof,
as contemplated by Uniform Rules 10(1), 10(2), 10(3), 11, 12(1),
12(2) and 12(4) ' That is the situation in which a party, not de-
judge, he shall instruct the trier of fact to accept as a fact the matter so
noticed.
"RULE 12. Judicial Notice in Proceedings Subsequent to Trial.
"(1) The failure or refusal of the judge to take judicial notice of a
matter, or to instruct the trier of fact with respect to the matter, shall not
preclude the judge from taking judicial notice of the matter in sub-
sequent proceedings in the action.
"(2) The rulings of the judge under Rules 9, 10 and 11 arc subject
to review.
"(3) The reviewing court in its descretion may take judicial notice
of any matter specified in Rule 9 whether or not judicially noticed by thejudge.
"(4) A judge or a reviewing court taking judicial notice under
Paragraph (1) or (3) of this rule of matter not theretofore so noticed
in the action shall afford the parties reasonable opportunity to present
information relevant to the propriety of taking such judicial notice and to
the tenor of the matter to be noticed."
2. Minn. Stat. (1953).
3. Minn. Const. Art. 4, § 36.
4. Minn. Stat. § 15.049 (1953).
5. Minn. Stat. § 544.20 (1953).
6. Minn. Stat. § 628.21 (1953).
7 Minn. Stat. § 600.17 (1953).
8. Minn. Stat. § 175.11 (1953). In addition § 192.81 requires all military
courts of the Minnesota National Guard to judicially notice the signature of
all commissioned officers of the National Guard.
9. See note 1, supra.
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siring to introduce evidence in support of some factual contention,
will request the trial court to judicially notice the fact for which
he is contending.. If judicially noticed, the matter will be covered by
an instruction, or may be the basis for a directed verdict, and will be
subject to review. Instead, almost all the decided Minnesota cases
involve the situation contemplated by Uniform Rule 12(3). They
are nearly all cases in which some matter was judicially noticed
initially by the Supreme Court of Minnesota. Possibly, in some of
the cases in which the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, and,
in doing so invoked the principle of judicial notice, the fact involved
had already been judicially noticed below. If so, that did not appear
from the published opinions. Thayer has pointed out'0 that to regard
judicial notice as merely a phase of the law of evidence obscures its
real nature; that instead, it belongs to the subject of judicial rea-
soning and belongs to all phases of the law in which reasoning is
important. The Uniform Rules seem to be based largely, although
not entirely, upon the concept of judicial notice as a phase of the
law of evidence, whereas the bulk of the Minnesota decisions seem
to be based upon the broader Thayerian concept of judicial notice
as a phase of legal reasoning. Specific aspects of the Uniform Rules
will now be considered.
I
Distinction b'etween Judicial Notice Being Mandatory and Being
Only Permzissive Unless a Request and Showing be Made.
Uniform Rule 9 provides m part:
"Facts which inust or may be judicially noticed.
"(1) judicial notice shall be taken without request by a party,
of..
"(2) Judicial notice may be taken without request by party,
of...
"(3) Judicial notice shall be taken of each matter specified in
paragraph (2) of this rule if a party requests it and (a) furnishes
the judge sufficient information to enable him properly to comply
with this request and (b) has given each adverse party such
notice as the judge may require to enable the adverse party to
prepare to meet the request."
Whether judicial notice is mandatory or permissive (unless re-
quested by a party who produces data to support his request) is a
question noted by the writers.n It is, however, a problem generally
ignored by Minnesota decisions. Absent the Uniform Rules, the
10. Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 278 (1898).
11. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2563 (3d ed. 1940), Morgan, Judicial Notice,
57 Harv. L. Rev. 269, 271, 276, 277 (1944), McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5
Vand. L. Rev. 296, 319, 320 (1952).
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one instance of mandatory judicial notice, generally recognized,
relates to the statutory and common lav of a court's own jurisdic-
tion.12 That such judicial notice is compulsory is true in the sense
that a court will be reversed if wrong as to the law even though the
proper authorities have not been called to its attention by counsel."3
Undoubtedly, that is the law of Minnesota. Minnesota does ex-
pressly recognize the distinction between compulsory and permissive
judicial notice in connection with the law of other states and various
inferior types of law, such as municipal ordinances.1 ' So far as
other types of judicial notice are concerned, there are plenty of
Minnesota decisions in which the Supreme Court uses judicial
notice in connection with its action of reversing the trial court. This
writer, however, has found no case in which the Supreme Court
reversed the trial court because it had failed to take judicial notice.
ii
Subject Matter of Judicial Notice" Judicial Notice of Law
Categories of judicial notice are well outlined by Professor Mc-
Cormick as follows .15
(1) Matters of common knowledge,
(2) Matters capable of definite or specific ascertainment,
(3) Matters which the judge, as such, has a special responsi-
bility for ascertaining,
(4) Matters known to other government departments, espe-
cially accessible to the judge,
(5) Social and political facts, particularly relevant to the judge's
participation in the law-making process.
Although not listed first the most striking instance of judicial
notice is in regard to what is normally called "law" Judicial notice
is a part of the judicial process, and what we call "law" is the most
striking product of that process. This would fall third on Mc-
Cormick's list. Wigmore"6 describes this type as follows
"Matters which the judicial function supposes the judge to be
acquainted with, in theory at least."
Provisions of the Uniform Rules regarding judicial notice of law
are as follows
12. Ibid.
13. k\ssuming, of course, that error has not been invited by affirmatively
misleading the court.
14. See notes 21. 22, 30. and 31 infra. It is not intended to state the rule.,
at this point, regarding judicial notice of various types of law. It is onlv
intended to point out that the distinction between mandatory and perminsive
judicial notice is recognized where the matter of judicial notice of certain
types of law is concerned.
15. McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 296-297 (1952) Com-
pare 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2571 (3d ed. 1940).
16. 9 Wigmnore, Evidence § 2571(2) (3d ed. 1940).
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"Rule 9....
"(1) Judicial notice shall be taken without request by a party,
of the common law, constitutions and public statutes in force
in every state, territory and jurisdiction of the United States...
"(2) judicial notice may be taken without request by a party,
of (a) private acts and resolutions of the Congress of the United
States and of the legislature of this state, and duly enacted ordi-
nances and duly published regulations of governmental sub-
divisions or agencies of this state, and (b) the laws of foreign
countries...."
It will be seen that some types of law fall into the category of man-
datory judicial notice,' 7 whereas judicial notice of other types of
law is permssive.m ' It must be borne in mind that any matter sub-
ject to permissive judicial notice becomes subject to mandatory
judicial notice if the requirements of Rule 9(3) are compiled with.
Whenever used, the term "permissive" judicial notice implies this
limitation.
It is evident that Rule 9(1) makes mandatory judicial notice of
the constitutions, general statutes and doctrinal law of the United
States and the State of Minnesota. Such is entirely in accord with
present Minnesota practice1 9 The Uniform Rules make mandatory
judicial notice of-the constitutions, general statutes and doctrinal
law of all other American states. Since the enactment of the Uniform
judicial Notice of Foreign Law Ac 0 in 1939, judicial notice of
such laws by Minnesota courts has been permissive,-' but not
17 Those covered by Rule 9(1).
18. Those covered by Rule 9(2).
19. In McDonald v. Railway Transfer Co., 121 Minn. 273, 141 N. W
177, 178 (1913) an act of Congress was judicially noticed. The following cases
involve judicial notice of Minnesota law- Midwest Wine Co. v. Ericson, 227
Minn, 24, 34 N. W. 2d 738 (1948), Peterson v. Village of Cokato, 84 Minn.
205, 87 N. W. 615 (1901) ; Burfenning v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 46
Minn. 20, 48 N. W. 444 (1891). Likewise, the provisions of municipal charters
(as distinguished from municipal ordinances) are judicially noticed by Min-
nesota doctrine. Oehler v. City of St Paul, 174 Minn. 410, 219 N. W 760
(1928) ; A. A. White Townsite Co. v. City of Moorhead, 120 Minn. 1, 138
N. W. 939 (1912). Home rule charters, by being drafted by the people of the
municipality, can hardly be considered as general state statutes; however,
they are judicially noticed by the terms of the Minnesota constitution, art. 4,§ 36.
20. Minn. Stat. §§ 599.04-.10 (1953).
21. Patterson v. Consumers Roofing Co., 209 Minn. 50, 295 N. V. 401
(1940), 25 Minn. L. Rev. 646 (1941). Formerly, Minnesota Courts did notjudicially notice the law of other American states; Patterson v. Consumers
Roofing Co., supra. There were ways by which the Minnesota courts could
mitigate the inconvenience of their refusal to judicially notice. By statute,
methods of proof were made more e.x-peditious (Minn. Stat §§ 599.01,
599.02, 599.03). Those statutes are still carned as active, although they
might be regarded as largely obsolete now. Also, certain presumptions were
helpful. For example, it was presumed that the law of another state was
the same as the common law of Minnesota. Beard v. Chicago, M. &
St P Ry., 134 Minn. 162, 158 N. W. 815, 816 (1916) ; Farmers State Bank Y.
19561
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mandatory 22 In contrast, Uniform Rule 9(2) (b) makes judicial
notice of the law of foreign countries only permissive. However,
under present law judicial notice of the law of foreign countries is
not even permissive. The decisions 23 denying such judicial notice
were prior to the enactment of the Uniform Judicial Notice of
Foreign Law Act but appear not to have been changed by that
act.24 Uniform Rule 9(2) (a) and the present law of Minnesota are
in accord in permitting judicial notice of private legislative enact-
ments, municipal ordinances and duly published administrative
regulations. Judicial notice of municipal ordinances goes back to
188525 and is currently established by statute20 and recognized by
decisions.27 The same statement may be made concerning private
statutes28 and duly published administrative regulations. 9 That the
judicial notice of municipal ordinances and private statutes is per-
Walch, 133 Minn. 230, 158 N. W 253, 254 (1916), Twin City Box Factory v.
Adirondack Fire Ins. Co., 114 Minn. 475, 131 N. W 497 (1911), Myers v.
Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 69 Minn. 476, 72 N. W 694, 695 (1897), Cooper
v. Reaney, 4 Minn. (Gil. 413) 528 (1850) , Desnoyer v. McDonald, 4 Minn.
(Gil. 402) 515 (1860).
22. Minn. Stat. § 599.04 (1945), In re Daniel's Estate, 208 Minn. 420,
294 N. W 465, 472 (1940). The question is not squarely settled by the statute,
standing alone. Section 599.04 uses the mandatory language "shall," but
§ 599.07 authorizes a party to request judicial notice provided "reasonable
notice shall be given to the adverse parties either in the pleadings or other-
wise." That section has been construed by 25 Minn. L. Rev. 646 to remove
judicial notice of the law of other states from the mandatory category. In re
Daniel's Estate, supra, holds that a party is not held to know the law of an-
other state. In reaching that conclusion the court states that, even under the
Uniform Act, it does not judicially notice the law of another state unless re-
quested to do so and the pertinent sources are called to the court's attention.
23. Greear v. Paust, 202 Minn. 633, 279 N. W 568 570 (1938) , Traders
Trust Co. v. Davidson, 146 Minn. 224, 178 N. W 735, 737 (1920) , 0. W
Kerr Co. v. Nygren, 114 Minn. 268, 130 N. W 1112, 1113 (1911), Lando v.
Lando, 112 Minn. 257, 127 N. W 1125, 1127 (1910).
24. The basic section (§ 1 of the Act, 599.04 of Minn. Stat.) specifies
only United States jurisdictions, thereby, by implication, excluding foreign
countries. Section 599.08 (§ 5 of the Uniform Act) specifies that the law of
every other jurisdiction shall be determined by the court, but shall not le
subject to judicial notice. See also, McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 Vand. 1.
Rev. 296, 307 (1952).
25. See Village of Minneota v. Martin, 124 Minn. 498, 145 N. W 383
(1914).
26. Minn. Stat. § 544.20 (1953).
27 Jedneak v. Minneapolis General Electric Co., 212 Minn. 226, 4 N. W
2d 326, 330 (1942) , Buhner v. Reusse, 144 Minn. 450, 175 N. W 1005, 1006
(1920), Village of Minneota v. Martin, 124 Minn. 498, 145 N. W 383 (1914),
State v. Overby, 116 Minn. 304, 133 N. W 792 (1911).
28. Permissive judicial notice was established by Minn. Stat. § 628.21
(1945) and recognized by Stabs v. City of Tower, 229 Minn. 552, 40 N. W
2d 362, 365 (1949), Burlington Mfg. Co. v. Board of Courthouse and City
Hall Comm'rs., 67 Minn. 327, 69 N. W 1091 (1897), Webb v. Bidwell, 15
Minn. (Gil. 394, 398) 479 (1870).
29. Judicial notice established by Minn. Stat. § 15.049 (1945) (incor-
porating by reference sections 15.045-15.048), and recognized in Bunten v.
Eastern Minnesota Power Co., 178 Minn. 604, 228 N. W 332 (1929).
1
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missive and not mandatory is shown by the statutory requirement
that ordinances and private statutes shall be pleaded and "there-
upon the court shall take judicial notice thereof."30 This pleading
requirement fulfills the same function as the request and notice in
Uniform Rule 9(3), and therefore changes permissive into manda-
tory judicial notice. There is no comparable pleading requirement
in the statute 1 dealing with judicial notice of administrative regula-
tions. On the contrary, the statute uses the mandatory language,
"Judicial notice . .shall be taken." However, this statute deals
with the same type of subject matter as those covering municipal
ordinances and private statutes, and it is here believed that the
judicial notice provided for is permissive.
III
Matters of Common Knowledge"
Uniform Rule 9 provides in part:
"(1) Judicial notice shall be taken without request by a party,
.. of such specific facts and propositions of generalized knowl-
edge as are so universally known that they cannot reasonably be
the subject of dispute.
"(2) Judicial notice may be taken without request by a party of,
... (c) such facts as are so generally known or of such common
notoriety within the territorial jurisdiction of the court that they
cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute... "
It will be observed that three categories are referred to:
(1) "Specific facts. universally known."
(2) "Propositons of generalized knowledge."
(3) "Facts ... generally known... within the territorial juris-
diction of the court."
The differentiation between universal knowledge and general knowl-
edge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court is quite clear.33
30. Minn. Stat. § 54420, 62821 (1953).
31. Minn. Stat § 15.049 (1953).
32. Because common knowledge is one of the most generally asserted
bases for judicial notice, there is sometimes a temptation to impart notice
or knowledge to the public generally of all things that will be judicially
noticed by a court. The Supreme Court of Minnesota fell into the error of
regarding the passage of a statute as notice to the public of an existing fact,
simply because the court would judicially notice the statute, in Minnesota v.
Messenger, 27 Minn. 119, '6 N. W 457 (1880). The same idea was followed
in Bauman v. Granite Say. Bank & Trust Co., 66 Minn. 227, 68 N. W 1074
(1896) in which the court implied that since it will judicially notice that
Duluth is in St Louis County, the public are charged with notice of that fact.
Fortunately, in Electric Short Line Term. Co. v. Minneapolis, 64 N. W. 2d
149, 154 (Minn. 1954) the court expressly overruled the Miessenger case. The
fallacy of the Messenger case was in concluding that because common knowl-
edge unplies judicial notice, judicial notice implies common knowledge.
33. This distinction is not expressed by the Minnesota Supreme Court
in so many words. However, there are cases in wich the court finds the exist-
ence of a common knowledge, which could not possibly exist otherwise than
1956]
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Not so obvious is the distinction between facts and propositions.
In innumerable cases the Supreme Court of Minnesota has taken
judicial notice of propositions of generalized knowledge, this writer
has found no case, however, in which a specific fact has been recog-
nized as being universally known.84 In other words, common knowl-
edge has not been used as a substitute for proof, rather, the Minne-
sota decisions basing judicial notice thereon use it as a phase of
judicial reasoning or judicial legislation. The term "judicial reason-
ing" is used to indicate that part of the judicial process whereby
the applicability of established rules of law to specific facts is deter-
mined. The term "judicial legislation" is used to indicate the activi-
ties of a court when confronted with a novel situation, or with a
need to modify rules of law to meet changing social conditions. The
difference between judicial reasoning and judicial legislation is one
of degree only, but in classifying the case material, the distinction
is a convement one. Professor McCormick states .85
" [C]ourts make a wider use of judicial notice in formulating
arguments in supporting conclusions of law than in deciding
particular facts of issue. "
This sets forth in different words the thought previously expressed.
It is submitted that the analysis here presented strikes the key as
to the difference between "specific facts" and "propositions of gen-
eralized knowledge." "Specific facts" would seem to correspond to
Professor McCormick's "particular facts in issue." On the other
hand, judicial notice of "propositions of generalized knowledge"
seems to correspond to what has been called, herein, judicial notice
as a matter of judicial reasoning or what Professor McCormick
calls "judicial notice in formulating arguments in supporting con-
clusions of law" This argument is supported by the fact that Rule
within the territorial jurisdiction of that court. In Petersen v. Holm, 66 N. W
2d 15, 16 (Minn. 1954) the court found that it was common knowledge,
especially among people of Scandinavian background, that Petersen and
Peterson are the same name. That would certainly not be common knowledge
except in a jurisdiction with many people of Norwegian or Swedish ancestry.
Likewise, in Erickson v. County of Steams, 190 Minn. 433, 252 N. W 219
(1934) the court took judicial notice that certain. Minnesota lakes were
navigable, and in In re Baldwin, 218 Minn. 11, 15 N. W 2d 184, 187 (19,14),
the court eloquently acknowledged the scenic beauties of Lake Minntonka.
It is respectfully submitted that only a person familiar with Minnesota would
be aware of these things. If the first two cases cited above were pending out-
side of Minnesota the court could inform itself by obtaining specific infor-
mation. Thus, this particular basis for judicial notice merges into the one to
be next considered, matters capable of a definite ascertainment.
34. Exceptions must be made of the cases referred to in note 33 supra.
In those cases the court judicially noticed facts known within the court's
territoral jurisdiction. If the Uniform Rules had been in effect in Minnesota
when those cases were decided judicial notice would have been under Rule
9(2) rather than Rule 9(1).
35. McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 296, 297 (1952)
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801 of the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence refers
to' 'propositions of generalized knowledge" but not to "specific
facts," which are covered in Rule 802. Rule 801 of the Model Code
corresponds with Uniform Rule 9(1), whereas Rule 802 corre-
sponds with Uniform Rule 9(2). It is evident, both from the fact
that Rule 801 combines "propositions of generalized knowledge"
with "common law and public statutes" and from the comment on
that rule,36 that such propositions are considered as a part of the
law-making or law-applying process. Judicial notice of "specific
facts" would almost always be made or denied by a trial court and
its action affirmed or reversed by a reviewing court. On the other
hand, since trial courts do not usually write opinions formally
rationalizing their decisions, judicial notice of "propositions of
generalized knowledge" will almost always be made initially by re-
viewing courts.
Sometimes propositions of generalized knowledge are used by
the Supreme Court in affirming the action of the trial court in
sustaining demurrers to pleadings.3 7 Other decisions uphold the
actions of the trial courts in submitting cases to juries 8 or with-
drawing them from juries.3 9 Judicial notice has proven useful in up-
36. A. L. L, Model Code of Evidence, 319 (1942). Consider particularly,
the following comment:
..... In determining whether a verdict is supported by the evidence,
both trial and appellate judges umversally apply those propositions of
generalized knowledge which are so generally known and accepted as
not to be the subject of dispute by intelligent men. No evidence of such
propositions is required, and, indeed, it would ordinarily be rejected if
offered."
37. In Marudas v. Odegard, 215 Minn. 357, 10 N. W. 2d -9234, 2 (1943),
the court judicially noticed that at the outset of World War II great changes
occurred in the auto business, and that, therefore, allegations that defendant
published that plaintiff had discontinued his automobile business do not allege
a cause of action for libel because going out of business, under such circum-
stances, does not imply insolvency. See also Wiseman v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
214 Minn. 101, 7 N. W. 2d 672 674 (1943) ; Laine v. Consolidated Vermillion
& Extension Co., 123 Minn. 24, 143 N. W. 783- (1913).
38. Baxter v. Great Northern Ry., 73 Minn. 189, 75 N. NV. 1114 (1898).
This was a suit for damages caused by a fire spreading from the defendant
railroad's right of way. One of the grounds upon which a directed verdict was
requested was that the section men were not acting in the course of their em-
ployment in starting the fire. In upholding the action of the trial court in
denying a directed verdict the court judicially noticed the usual functions of
sectionmen.
39. These are the cases in which directed verdicts have been given, or
cases have been otherwise withdrawn, as by judgments notwithstanding the
verdict. Examples of such cases are: Syverson v. Nelson, 70 N. W 2d 880,
883 (Minn. 1955) ; Person v. Okes, 224 Minn. 541, 29 N. AV. 2d 360, 362
(1947); Plotke v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 210 Minn. 541, 299 N. W. 216
(1941); Betcher v. Capital Fire Ins. Co., 78 Minn. 240, 80 N. IV. 971, 972
(1899). In Person v. Okes, supra, plaintiff, a domestic servant, was injured
when a small step ladder she was using collapsed. She sought to establish
notice of the defect on the part of the defendant by reason of fact that he had
19561
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holding instructions given by trial courts."0 In one case4' the trial
court was upheld in rejecting evidence of a fact judicially noticed.
In holding damages not to be excessive the court may also use
judicial notice.42 In two cases the Supreme Court used judicial
notice in upholding the actions of the Industrial Commission. '
The cases in which the Supreme Court used judicial notice as a part
of its reasoning in reversing the trial court are fewer in number than
those in which that principle has been used to accomplish an affirm-
ance. In the decisions here noted, trial courts submitted cases to
the juries, and the court resorted to judicial notice in holding that the
issues should have been withdrawn, either by use of the directed ver-
dict or the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 44 In these cases is
presented judicial reasoning in a more extreme form. It is easier
to uphold a trial court than to grant a reversal, as witness the fact
that far more of the cases here cited are affirmances than reversals.
It is also easier to reverse the action of the trial court in directing a
verdict and remand for jury trial, as was done in Himmel v.
Orlisk,.45 Therefore, more acute and fundamental reasoning is re-
quired in reversing judgment on a verdict. An example may be
found in Berry v. Northern States Power Co.,40 which was a death
case. Plaintiff's decedent was electrocuted when he tried to tic a
discarded the ladder. In rejecting that argument and upholding a judgment
on a directed verdict for defendant, this court judicially noticed that there
are many reasons, other than knowledge of defects, why ladders arc dis-
carded.
40. Chicago, M. & St. P Ry. v. Anderson, 168 Fed. 901 (8th Cir. 1909),
State v. Bentley, 231 Minn. 531, 45 N. W 2d 185, 193 (1950).
41. Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., 69 N. W 2d 673, 684 (Minn. 1955)
42. Holz v. Pearson, 229 Minn. 395, 39 N. W 2d 867, 874 (1949),
Kauppi v. Northern Pacific Ry., 235 Minn. 104, 49 N. W 2d 670 (1951)
Swanson v. J. L. Shiely Co., 234 Minn. 548, 48 N. W 2d 848, 855 (1951)
Eichten v. Central Minnesota Cooperative Power Ass'n, 224 Minn. 180, 28
N. W 2d 862 (1947). In the last three cases cited the court judicially noticed
the greatly reduced purchasing power of money in holding that verdicts much
larger than previously granted in similar types of cases were not excessive.
43. In upholding an award of compensation the court recognized that the
public generally did not suffer from bursitis. Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Co.,
220 Minn. 318, 19 N. NV 2d 795 (1945). In Corcoran v. Fitzgerald Bros., 239
Minn. 38, 58 N. W 2d 744 (1953), the court, in affirming a dental of comn-
pensation, judicially noticed that when an employer puts up a ten foot fence,
he has not created an avenue of ingress and egress.
44. St. Paul Hotel Co. v. Lohm, 196 F 2d 233, 235 (8th Cir. 1952),
Beery v. Northern States Power Co., 239 Minn. 48, 57 N. W 2d 838, 8411
(1953), Otto v. Sellnow, 233 Minn. 215, 46 N. W 2d 641 (1951).
45. 221 Minn. 192, 21 N. W 2d 605, 607 (1946). Plaintiff was a pe(des-
trian and a child of seven and was struck by defendant's vehicle at ain inter-
section. The evidence was that defendant entered the intersection on a green
light, and that, therefore, the light plaintiff approached was red at the time
of the impact. It was conceded, however, that if plaintiff's light was green
when he entered, there was at least a case for the jury. In reversing the judg-
ment entered upon a directed verdict for defendant the court judicially
noticed that traffic lights stay yellow a very short time.
46. 239 Minn. 48, 57 N. W 2d 838, 841 (1953).
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rope to a live wire. In reversing judgment for plaintiff and holding
that the trial court should have granted defendant's motion for judg-
ment n.o.v., on the ground of contributory negligence as a matter
of law, the court judicially noticed the great danger from electricity.
Before moving to the subject of judicial notice as judicial legis-
lation it should be observed that the cases cited present only a sample
of instances in which judicial notice is an aspect of judicial reason-
ing. Only those cases were considered in which the court expressly
used the words "judicial notice" or some comparable expressions
such as "it is common knowledge" or "everybody knows." Actually,
whenever a judge makes an assertion in an opinion, other than
a reference to facts apparent from the record being reviewed, he is
committing an act of judicial notice. It is in that way that judicial
notice is as broad as the judicial process.
Differing only in degree from judicial notice as judicial reason-
ing is judicial notice as judicial legislation. That judges do legislate
is accepted today.47 This phase of judicial notice is Professor Mfc-
Cormick's fifth category.43 At another point40 he expresses the same
thought by the wording of his heading No. 7: "Social and economic
data used in judicial law-making: 'Legislative' facts." Professor
Davis differentiates between "official notice" and "judicial notice '50
and makes it clear that official notice is not merely an administrative
version of judicial notice. Official notice is said to relate to the legis-
lative activities of administrative agencies. Actually, judicial notice,
in the sense now being discussed comes pretty close to what Pro-
fessor Davis regards as official notice. To say that the courts may
legislate should not be regarded as implying that they legislate in
the same way as legislatures do. Legislative acts may be, and usually
are in form, entirely arbitrary On the other hand a court is ex-
pected to reason out every decision. Thus, judicial legislation may
well be regarded as a phase of judicial reasoning. The premises
with which a court starts its reasoning process may be legislative
enactments, or authoritative principles,51 or the facts of social life.
Judicial notice is the process by which social conditions (usually
changing), requiring rationalized legislation, come to the court's
attention? 2 It may be questioned whether judicial notice as judicial
legislation is properly discussed under the heading of common
knowledge. The reason for doing so are twofold: (1) the Minne-
47. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 98 (1921).
48. McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 296, 297 (1952).
49. Id. at 315.
50. Davis, Official Notice, 62 -arv. L. Rev. 537, 549-560 (1949).
51. Pound, My Philosophy of Law, 249, 257 (1941).
52. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269, 289 (1944).
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sota cases which can be properly brought into this discussion use
the language of common knowledge and (2) the Uniform Rules
recognize no separate category corresponding to this type of judicial
notice but, it is believed, include it under the phrase "propositions of
generalized knowledge."
Judicial notice is frequently used by courts in the decision of
constitutional questions. Two classical examples, both decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States in cases appealed from the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, may be cited. Well known is Mr
Justice Brandeis' famous opinion in Davis v. Farmers Co-operatwe
Equzty Co.53 In holding that to permit jurisdiction over a railroad
which had its principle operation far from Minnesota would con-
stitute an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce, the
court judicially recognized many facts. The same technique was used
to uphold the constitutionality of the compulsory arbitration provi-
sions of the Minnesota standard fire insurance policy in Hardware
Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Glidden Co. 54 In reaching
its conclusion the court said "we know" and then enumerated many
facts which it believed to be true and which would tend to support
its conclusions regarding the legislation attacked. In holding uncon-
stitutional a statute separating the wine from the liquor business at
the wholesale level but not at the retail level, the court in George
Benz Sons, Inc. v. Erzcson" judicially noticed that there are far
more retailers of liquor than wholesalers, and that they come more
intimately into contact with the public. The court judicially noticed
that one of the functions of a bartender is to keep order, and upheld,
in Anderson v. City of St. Paul," an ordinance permitting only
men to be bartenders as against the attack that it involved a discrimi-
nation based on sex. In Eldred v. Divsion of Employment and Sr-
cunrity57 the constitutionality of the unemployment compensation law
was upheld. One attack was that it was discriminatory because it
only applied to employees in municipalities over 10,000 population. In
upholding its constitutionality the court judicially noticed that most
unemployment is in municipalities of that size.58
53. 262 U. S. 312, 315 (1923), reversing 150 Minn. 534, 186 N. W 130
(1921).
54. 284 U. S. 151, 159 (1931), affirming 181 Minn. 518, 233 N. W 310
(1930).
55. 227 Minn. 1, 34 N. W 2d 725 733 (1948).
56. 226 Minn. 186, 32 N. W 2d 38 (1948).57 209 Minn. 58, 295 N. W 412, 415 (1940).
58. Other cases using the principle of judicial notice in passing upon the
constitutionality of statutes are: Oscar P Gustafson Co. v. Minneapolis, 231
Minn. 271, 42 N. W 2d 809, 812 (1950), Village of St. Louis Park v Casey
218 Minn. 394, 16 N. W 2d 459 (1944), Erickson v. King, 218 Minn. 98, 15
N. W 2d 201, 203 (1944). In upholding the constitutionality of the mortgage
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The question should be discussed as to whether Uniform Rule
9(1) maldng mandatory judicial notice of specific facts and proposi-
tions of generalized knowledge would change the law of Minnesota.
In very few instances has the distinction between mandatory and
permissive judicial notice been expressed in Minnesota. It is be-
lieved that judicial notice of specific facts is now permissive. Since
judicial notice of propositions of generalized knowledge is a phase
of judicial reasoning, it is assimilated to judicial notice of domestic
law, and thus is mandatory. This is true in the sense that if a trial
court is wrong it will be reversed, even though its error resulted
from a failure to judicially notice some proposition which was not
called to the court's attention.
IV
Matters Capable of Immediate and Accurate Determination
Uniform Rule 9(2) (d) provides:
"Judicial notice may be taken without request by a party, of...
(d) specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge
which are capable of immediate and accurate determination by
resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy."
This rule refers to one of the standard categories of judicial notice
and is of increasing importance.59 The Minnesota decisions, how-
ever, are far from clear as to this basis for judicial notice. The
language of Minnesota decisions refers extensively to common
knowledge, but makes no reference to immediate and accurate
ascertainment as a basis for judicial notice. Furthermore, the" cases
are far from being in accord in their results and there are certainly
cases which have refused to judicially notice facts capable of specific
ascertainment. Courts have refused to judicially notice the action
taken by specific counties under local option statutes,s0 or the con-
tents of legislative journals to see if a required two-thirds vote was
obtained, 61 or records in the registrar's office. 2 General scientific
propositions have fared little better than the specific facts dealt with
in the preceding cases. In Lickfett v. Jorgeson s3 the court refused
moratorium law the court judicially noticed the existence of a state of
emergency. Home Bldg. & L. Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 444 (1934),
affirming 189 Minn. 422,249 N. W. 334 (1933) and 189 Minn. 448, 249 N. W
893 (1933).
59. McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 296, 297, 300, 323(1952).
60. Olson v. Pederson, 206 Minn. 415, 288 N. W. 856 (1939) ; State v.
Kusick, 148 Minn. 1, 180 N. W. 1021 (1921).
61. Burt v. Winona & St. P. R. R., 31 Min. 472, 18 N. W. 285, 288(1884). But see note 77 infra, for a case apparently in conflict.
62. Williams v. Langevin, 40 Minm. 180, 41 N. W. 936 (1889).
63. 179 Minn. 321, 229 N. W. 138 (1930).
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to judicially notice the increased danger of being struck by lightning
while on the highway,6 4 and in Christensen v. Northern States
Power Co., 6 5 the court refused to judicially notice the effect upon
marine life of blasting and electricity shorted into water. The court
seemed to limit judicial notice to matters of common knowledge. So
far as the cases here cited are concerned the uniform rules would
seem to present a drastic addition to Minnesota's common law
Although the Minnesota cases do not announce capacity for
summary and certain determination as a ground for judicial notice,
many decisions cannot be explained upon any other basis. Some-
times the court may indulge in the fiction of calling something com-
mon knowledge which really isn't. In judicially noticing the num-
ber of votes cast at an election in State v. Stearns0 the court said
that "every intelligent man knows" that information. It is submitted
that such a statement is in error, although it is a matter which every
intelligent man can quickly and certainly ascertain. 07 Without par-
ticularly stating the reason, the court has judicially noticed the
following facts hour of sunset on a specific date;"' the number of
votes cast at a certain election ;69 that only one piece of land in
Minnesota can be described as "NW 4 of Sec. 1, township 49,
range 15" ;70 that Saturday fell upon a certain day of the month ;ui
and that October 13, 1861, did fall on Sunday 72 All of these matters
would seem to be demonstrable propositions but not general knowl-
edge.
64. The following expression of the court shows the tenor of its think-
ing" " We do not take judicial notice of things which are not of com-
mon and general understanding. [W]e cannot take judicial notice of such
facts as are known, if at all, only by a specially informed class of persons. "
Id. at 139. Cases throughout the United States usually decide such issues as
this the other way. For a leading authority contrary to the Minnesota case see
Missouri ex rel F T. O'Dell Constr. Co. v. Hostetter, 340 Mo. 1155, 104
S. W 2d 671 (1937).
65. 222 Minn. 474, 25 N. W 2d 659 (1946).
66. 72 Minn. 200, 75 N. W 210, 215 (1898) reversed on other grounds,
179 U. S. 223 (1900).
67 See also Eldred v, Division of Employment and Security, 209 Minn.
58, 295 N. W 412, 415 (1940) in which the court consulted statistical tables
in judicially noticing that most unemployment is in localities over 10,000.
The court considered its action to be based upon common knowledge, but the
fact that tables were consulted would indicate that, instead, it was based upon
determination. Minnesota is not alone in this tendency to indulge in the fiction
that propositions which can be demonstrated to be true are commonly known.
See McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 296, 300 (1952).
68. Cohen v. Silverman, 153 Minn. 391, 190 N. W 795, 796 (1922).
69. Minnesota v. Tosney, 26 Minn. 262, 3 N. W 345 (1879) In State v.
Stearns, note 66, supra, such information was regarded as common knowledge.
70. Quinn v. Champagne, 38 Minn. 322, 37 N. W 451, 452 (1888)
71. Starbuck v. Dunklee, 10 Minn. (Gil. 136, 140) 168 (1865).
72. Finney v. Callendar, 8 Minn. (Gil. 23, 26) 41 (1863). In this case
the court consulted an almanac and judicially noticed the fact therein stated
rather than simply judicially noticing the reliability of the source of mforma-
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Judicial notice may also be based upon the special capacity of
the judge to make certain types of determinations. 3 This is usually
considered to be a separate basis. 74 However, the drafters of the
Uniform Rules do not so treat it, and it can well be brought under
the category-of matters capable of being immediately and accurately
demonstrated. Thus, the court will judicially notice its own rec-
ords,7 5 the authenticity of signatures and seals of various public
officials,76 entries in legislative journals77 and records of the county
treasurer's office.7 S
In conclusion, it may be said that the Uniform Rules would
clarify aid render certain what might now be considered to be sub-
ject to some doubt and uncertainty under existing Minnesota law.
tion. It has been pointed out that sometimes a court will judicially notice the
reliability of a particular source of information, and will admit that source
for the jury's consideration, without judicially noticijig the facts therein
stated. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 306 (1898) ; 9 Wigmore,
Evidence § 2566 (3d ed. 1940) ; McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 Vand. L. Rev.
296, 318 (1952). It seems as if that situation can be analyzed as a matter of
evidence law. Evidence is generally rejected for one of three reasons: (1)
Irrelevancy, (2) unreliability, and (3) policy considerations. Evidence of a
general category may be rejected because it is regarded as unreliable. The
hearsay rule is the best example of this. Some particular species of that type
of evidence may, however, be considered reliable, and therefore admissible.
Here we have an exception to the hearsay rule, based upon a proposition ofjudicial notice.
73. It is well known that judicial notice cannot be based upon the per-
sonal knowledge of a judge. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2569 (3d ed. 1940).
Compare Masterson v. Le Claire, 4 Minn. (Gil. 108) 163 (1860), holding
that the court will take judicial notice of the signature of an attorney, when
executed in his capacity as such, but will not judicially notice the signature
of the very same lawyer, when signed in a personal matter.
74. See 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2571(2) and §§ 2574-2579 (3d ed.
1940); McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 296, 297 (third and
fourth categories) and 311-315. McCormick assimilates this category to mat-
ters of law rather than to matters capable of immediate and accurate determi-
nation, as is done here.
75. Examples are: Court's own decision in prior related cases, Bowe-
Burke Mining Co. v. Willcuts, 45 F. 2d 394 (D. Minn. 1930) ; Brokl v. Brold,
133 Minn. 334,158 N. V. 436 (1916) , steps taken by party necessary to estab-
lish jurisdiction, Bond v. Pennsylvania R. R., 124 Minn. 195 144 N W. 942(1914) ; S. E. Olson Co. v. Brady, 76 Minn. 8, 78 N. W. 864 (1899) ; prior
proceedings in the-same case, in re Kepp Electric & Manufacturing Co., 98 F.
Supp. 51, 65 (D. Minn. 1951) appeal dismissed 191 F. 2d 735; In re Rees, 39
Min. 401, 40 N. W. 370 (1888). Testimony m a prior stage of the case is
entirely different That is not a matter of record and thus not the subject ofjudicial notice. Taylor v. Northern States Power Co., 196 Minn. 22, 264
N. W 139 (1935); Maclntyre v. Albers, -175 Minn. 411, 221 N. W. 526(1928). If admissible at all, as an exception to the hearsay rule, evidence
must be offered.
76. State ex rel. Becker v. Brotherhood of American Yoeman, III Minn.
39, 126 N. W. 404, 405 (1910); Minnesota v. Barrett, 40 Mirm. 65, 41 N. XA.
459 (1889) ; Sherrerd v. Frazer, 6 Minn. (Gil 406) 572 (1861), Minn. Stat.§§ 175.11, 600.17 (1953).
77. Miesen v. Canfield, 64 Minm. 513, 67 N. W' 632 (1896). This is
difficult to reconcile with Burt v. Winona & St. P R. R., note 61, supra.
78. State ex rel. Neff v. District Court, 140 Minn. 375, 168 N. 1XV. 184
"(1918) ; Williams v. Langevin, 40 Minn. 180, 41 N. W. 936 (1889).
1956]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
V
Ride 10 "Determinatin as to Propriety of Judicial Notice
and Tenor of Matter Noticed" 79
The first three sections of this rule are in accord with the general
practice throughout the country and do not change any Minnesota
precedents.8 0 Rule 10(1) gives each party an opportunity to present
information to the court concerning the propriety of taking judicial
notice. This practice is well known to all members of the bar so far
as judicial notice of domestic law is concerned. There, the informa-
tion presented to the court is in the form of statutes, decisions, and
various secondary sources. It is strikingly true that if judicial notice
be based upon determination, opportunity to present information is
indispensable. Even where judicial notice is based upon common
knowledge, such opportunity should be afforded. The writer has
found no contrary Minnesota case, and the recent case of In re Land
0' Lakes Creameries, Inc.,81 is in accord, at least inferentially In
that case the Supreme Court rejected an administrative determina-
tion, based upon judicial notice by the administrative agency, that
turkey raising is non-seasonal. The case was remanded for evidence.
The case shows that a decision taking judicial notice can be upset
when a contrary showing is made.
Rule 10(2) permits the judge to consult any source of pertinent
information, and eliminates exclusionary rules, except for valid
claims of privilege. No Minnesota cases dealing with the subject
of exclusionary rules have been found. The rest of the rule accords
with present Minnesota practice and with general practice.1
Reference has already been made to various types of determinations
which would be impossible without the broad latitude here per-
mitted . 3 The court has explicitly considered statistical tables in
taking judicial notice as to the locality of unemployment. 84 In
Han.son v. Hayess5 the court inspected the decisions of the Industrial
Commission to determine how that body had construed the Com-
pensation Act. So far as judicial notice of the law of another state
is concerned, section 2 of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign
79. For a full text of this rule see note 1 supra.
80. So far as the writer has been able to discover.
81. 68 N. W 2d 256, 261 (Minn. 1955).
82. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2568a (3d ed. 1940).
83. Such as number of votes cast, dates of the month, certain days of
the week.
84. Eldred v. Division of Employment and Security, 209 Minn. 58, 295
N. W 412, 415 (1940).
85. 225 Minn. 48, 29 N. W 2d 473 (1947).
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Law Act", has the same provisions as Uniform Rule 10(2) (a)."
The elimination of exclusionary rules by Uniform Rule 10( 2 ) (b)
is in line with the distinction between "evidence" and "informa-
tional data." 5's It seems as though "informational data" is something
offered to persuade a court (such as law books) in connection with
its decision on the subject of judicial notice, whereas "evidence"
is something offered to persuade a trier of fact.89
Uniform Rule 10(3), providing that there be no judicial notice
unless the judge is convinced, is clearly in accord with Minnesota
law. 0 This is understandable when it is considered that failure to
judicially notice merely requires a party to offer his proof.
Uniform Rule 10(4) is a bit puzzling. It provides-
"In any event the determination either by judicial notice or
from evidence of the applicability and the tenor of any matter
of common law, constitutional law, or of any statute, private act,
resolution, ordinance or regulation falling within Rule 9, shall
be a matter for the judge and not for the jury."
Here it looks as though the drafters of the Uniform Rules do not
have faith in their own handiwork. If they mean what they say under
Rule 9, all the matters mentioned m Rule 10(4) are judicially
noticed. That necessarily implies that determination is made by the
court and not the jury. Is it then a redundancy to specifically so
provide? The commissioners, themselves, offer the following ex-
planatory comment:
"*... Clause (4) of Rule 10 is suggested by the Uniform Judi-
cial Notice of Foreign Law Act so as to make it clear that deter-
mninations of applicable law are not properly questions of fact for
the jury but are for the judge to determine. This is true whether
evidence is offered on the issue of what the law is or whether the
rule of judicial notice is strictly invoked. In this respect the old
86. Minn. Stat. § 599.05 (1953).
87. Minn. Stat. §§ 599.01, 599.02 and 599.03 (1953) seem to be super-
seded, so far as the law of other American States is concerned, by § 599.05,
and would be superseded as to foreign law, as well, by Uniform Rule
10(2) (a). Sections 599.01-599.03 deal with methods of proof rather than withjudicial notice. Even under judicial notice, it is necessary that there be a
method of establishment. However the "any pertinent source of information"
basis of Rule 10(2) (a) is more inclusive than the particular methods of the
sections.
88. See Nix -* Hedden, 149 U. S. 304, 307 (1893) ; McCormick, Judicial
Notice, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 296, 320 (1952).
89. Compare, however, Minn. Stat. § 599.07 (1953), in which attorneys
are permitted to offer "evidence of such laws" m connection with the action
of the court in judicially noticing the law of other American States.
90. State ex rel. Remick v. Clousing, 205 Minn. 296, 285 N. W. 711, 714(1939) in which the court states:
" - Judicial notice is to be taken with caution, and every reasonable
doubt as to the propriety of its exercise ... should be resolved against
it...." -
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common law rule is changed. The issue of what the foreign law
is, was commonly one of fact for the jury"
The' reference to the Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act is t-
doubtedly to sections 3 and 5 of that act."' That act provides for
judicial notice only of the law of other states of the United States.
Therefore it is quite logical to provide in section 5 that issues as to
the law of foreign countries, and as to municipal ordinances, regu-
lations, etc., of other states shall be decided by the court and not the
jury Section 3 of the Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act 92 is sub-
stantially the same as Uniform Rule 10(4) The commissioner's
note thereto is as follows .3
"This correction of the old common law rule, by making the
foreign law determinable by the judge, not the jury, is a neces-
sary corollary of assimilating sister-State law to forum law "
Strictly speaking, it seems to be a redundancy rather than a corol-
lary, however, it may be justified out of an abundance of caution.
It puts the courts on notice that, unlike other matters subject to
judicial notice, law shall never be decided by the jury, even though
sufficient informational data to justify a court decision is not avail-
able. In any event, it is evident that Uniform Rule 10(4) is entirely
in accord with existing Minnesota law
VI
Theory of Judicial Notice
(Herein, Uniform Rule 11)
Decisions regarding judicial notice as a part of evidence law
are made in the first instance by the trial court.0 4 If the trial judge
refuses to judicially notice a fact the only recourse is by review The
party requesting judicial notice, which has been refused, is free
to offer evidence, but it is obvious that the jury would not be re-
91. Minn. Stat. §§ 599.07 and 599.08 (1953). The latter section (section
5 of the Uniform Act) provides
"The law of a jurisdiction other than those referred to in section
599.04 [every state, territory, and other jurisdiction of the United States]
shall be an issue for the court, but shall not be subject to the provisions of
sections 599.04 to 599.07 concerning judicial notice."
The annotation to that section cites the following cases. Grecar v. Paust, 202
Minn. 633, 279 N. W 568, 570 (1938) , Traders Trust Co. v. Davidson, 146
Minn. 224, 178 N. W 735, 737 (1920), Kerr v. Nygren, 114 Minn. 268, 130
N. W 1112, 1113 (1911), Lando v. Lando, 112 Minn. 257, 127 N. W 1125,
1127 (1910). Those cases merely hold that the court will not judicially notice
the law of foreign countries. They say nothing about who decides what that
law is.
92. Minn. Stat. § 599.06 (1953). It provides
"The determination of such laws [those judicially noticed under §
599.04] shall be made by the court and not by the jury, and shall be
reviewable."
93. 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 404 (1951).
94. This is not to be confused with judicial notice of propositions of
generalized knowledge by a reviewing court as a part of its reasoning process.
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viewing the court's decision but would be passing upon the matter
in issue. What happens if the trial court takes judicial notice of
some fact? Two such outstanding authorities as Professor Thayer
and Dean Wigmore seem to have taken the position that any issue
of fact is still open for determination by the trier of fact.05 According
to Professor Morgan the jury is bound to accept the court's de-
cision upon a matter judicially noticed.90 Others have taken the
same view.97 Of course; no one contends that a judge is irrevocably
bound not to change his own decision judicially noticing some mat-
ter. Production of informational data by a party adversely affected
by the court's action, may well induce the judge to change his mind
and leave to the trier of fact a matter previously noticed. The right
of the party to attempt to induce the judge to change his mind
is clearly recognized by Uniform Rule 10(1).
A reference to the basic rationale of judicial notice is necessary
in order to decide which of the two views is correct. AVe must start
with the underlying principle that there is a division of function
between court and trier of fact. Some questions are decided by
judges, others by triers of fact. jurors, masters in chancery or
judges. Little value is found in a rigid analytical dichotomy be-
tween questions of law and questions of fact. The legislative and
doctrinal rules accepted as major premises in any particular case
may be called the "law" of that case. However, even in a trial with
a jury, the judge decides many other things. Why? In some in-
stances, he acts merely as a matter of expedition and to avoid con-
fusing the jury with collateral issues. If it is Dean WNigmore's
understanding that this is the reason for judicial notice, the Thayer-
Wigmore theory would seem to be sound. But can it be said that
expedition is the reason for judicial notice? If a matter is of such
common knowledge that no informational data is required there is
no reason why the jury cannot use such information without an
instruction from the court. In fact, it seems, the jury canY9 Even if
95. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 308 (1898) ; 9 Wigmore,
Evidence § 2567 (3d ed. 1940). This is the interpretation Professor Morgan
places upon the position of those two commentators. Unfortunately, their
language is not entirely free from doubt. When Wiginore says, "But the
opponent-is not prevented from disputing the matter by evidence, if he be-
lieves it disputable,.. ." he may be using the term "evidence" in the sense of
informational data aimed at persuading the court to change its decision.
96. Morgan, Judicial Notice 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269, 280 (1944).
97. McCormick, Judicial Notice 5 Vand. L. Rev. 296, 321 (1952) ; Keefe,
Landis and Shaad, Sense and Nonsense about Judicial Notice 2 Stan. L. Rev.
664 (1950). For a statement of the conflicting points of view see Baldwin and
Dodge, -A Code of Evidence for Wisconstin? 1945 Wis. L. Rev. 192, 204.
98. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 296 (1898) ; 9 Wigmore,
Evidence § 2570 (3d ed. 1940) ; Morgan, Judicial Notice 57 Harv. L. Rev.
269, 272 (1944); McCormick, Judicial Notice 5 Vand. L. Rev. 296, 299
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informational data is necessary, as in the case of judicial notice
based upon determination, said data can be presented to the jury as
evidence as expeditiously as it can be presented to the court.99 Even
statutory and doctrinal law is no exception, as witness the fact that
at certain times in the past such matters have been determined by
juries.100 Rather than being a matter of expediting the trial, it would
seem as if the basis for judicial notice is to be found in the public
policy which demands a degree of uniformity in the administration
of justice. This point is well put by Professor Morgan as follows .101
"In any system designed to adjust relations between mem-
bers of a society, the applicable law ought not to be allowed to
vary with the diligence and skill of counsel, and a decision con-
trary to what is accepted as indisputable fact in that society can-
not be justified.
The function of judicial notice, as a device for obtaining uniformity
of decision, would be frustrated if the jury could re-examine a matter
determined by the court.
The writer has found no present Minnesota authority upon the
question of whether or not the jury may redetermine a matter judi-
cially noticed. Uniform Rule 11 provides
"Instructing the Trier of Fact as to Matter Judicially No-
ticed. If a matter judicially noticed is other than the common law
or constitution or public statutes of this state, the judge shall
indicate for the record the matter which is judicially noticed and
if the matter would otherwise have been for determination by a
(1952). It is proper to instruct the jury that in evaluating the evidence they
may consider their general knowledge. In some jurisdictions the court may
even comment upon the evidence, which is really a matter of suggesting to
the jury matters of general knowledge to be considered. Whitaker v. Chicago,
St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 115 Minn. 140, 131 N. W 1061, 1063 (1911) should be
understood as a matter of comment rather than a matter of judicial notice.
In that case suit was brought by a consignee against a carrier for damages
suffered when a shipment of strawberries spoiled en route. In affirming judg-
ment upon a verdict for the defendant, the court states as follows
"Nor was there any error in stating to the jury in the charge that
strawberries have an inherent tendency to become heated and moldy. This
is a tendency of all ripe fruit, and a fact commonly known, and of which
the court will take notice."
The trial court, in the instruction upheld, was not deciding an issue of fact,
but reminding the jury of something they might consider in connection with
their decision.
99. This is subject, of course, to the hurdle of exclusionary rules. Under
Uniform Rule 10(2) (b) a judge is not so frustrated when considering infor-
mational data for the purpose of determining whether or not to take judicial
notice. However, in any situation in which a court would be persuaded by a
particular item of informational data, the judge can judicially notice the relia-
bility of the source and so admit the data into evidence, exclusionary rules
to the contrary notwithstanding. See note 72 supra.
100. This is true today in Justice of the Peace courts in many jurisdic-
tions just as it was true in criminal cases in some states during the past
century.
101. Morgan, Judicial Notice 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269, 273 (1944)
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trier of fact other than the judge, he shall instruct the trier of fact
to accept as a fact the matter so noticed."
This clearly seems to follow the Morgan view. To "instruct the
trier of fact to accept" implies that evidence contrary to the court's
determination will be accepted. Thus, Rule 11 definitely, and prop-
erly, clarifies Minnesota law.
VII
Rule 12: Judical Notice in Proceedings
Subsequent to Trial
The writer has found no Minnesota authority either supporting
or in conflict with Uniform Rule 12(1) dealing with judicial notice
by the trial court in proceedings subsequent to trial. So sound a
rule must certainly be in accord with Minnesota law. However, the
Uniform Rules do have a clarifying effect in that regard. Uniform
Rule 12(2) providing for review of trial court decisions on the
subject of judicial notice is sound and in accord with Minnesota
law.102 Rule 12(3) providing for initial judicial notice in the review-
ing court presents the situation actually found in the overwhelming
majority of cases decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota.Uniform Rule 12(4) presents something of a real problem. It
provides:
"A judge or a reviewing court taking judicial notice under
Paragraph (1) or (3) of this rule of matter not theretofore so
noticed in the action shall afford the parties reasonable oppor-
tunity to present information relevant to the propriety of taking
such judicial notice and to the tenor of the matter to be noticed."
There appears to be nothing on this subject in the present statutory
or doctrinal law in Minnesota. Perhaps the presentation of informa-
tional data as part of a petition for rehearing might constitute a
compliance with this rule, but that seems to go beyond what is
normally thought of as the purpose of such a procedure. In so far
as Rule 12(4) relates to judicial notice taken initially by the review-
ing court under Rule 12(3) the problem is pointed because most
cases involving judicial notice are cases of initial action by the
Supreme Court. In a case such as Cohen v. Silvernan,103 in which
the court, in reversing judgment entered upon a directed verdict for
defendant, judicially noticed the hour of sunset, the court would be
bound to provide opportunity to present informational data under
102. Casper v. Frederick, 146 Minn. 112, 177 N. AV 936 (1920). See
State v. Overby, 116 Min . 304, 133 N. W. 792 (1911) in wluch the Supreme
Court of Minnesota avoids deciding whether it will review the tral court's
action in the absence of the pertinent informational data appearing in the
record.
103. 153 Minn. 391, 190 N. W. 795, 796 (1922).
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Uniform Rule 12(4) It is not clear that such a judicial obligation
does exist under present Minnesota law. Cohen v. Silverman
clearly fits the. situation contemplated by Rule 12(4) because a
specific fact was there determined and noticed. Cases in which the
reviewing court bases its original judicial notice upon common
knowledge, are not so clear. It has been pointed out that such
judicial notice really involves a matter of judicial reasoning. This
seems to be foreign to what is contemplated by Rule 12(4), cer-
tainly in cases in which the trial court is affirmed. In those cases
the Supreme Court agrees with the trial court and presents its
reasons for agreeing. It is fair'to assume that the reasons are not
far different from those already advanced by the lower court or
by appellee in his brief. But when the reviewing court uses judicial
notice for the purpose of reversing the trial court, the party against
whom the decision runs has had no opportunity to refute the court's
action. Therefore, it might well be argued that Rule 12(4) would
require that opportunity be provided to present relevant informa-
tion. However, since a court always uses reasoning in its opinions,
an opportunity to present data against matters stated in the opinion
would reduce it to a status of a mere intermediate report. It is be-
lieved that, even in cases of reversal, Rule 12(4) entitles the losing
party to no more of an opportunity to present data against state-
ments made in the opinion than would be present in the usual peti-
tion for rehearing.
Conchmons
By way of conclusion, a reclassification of the matters already
covered will be attempted under the following headings
1. Respects in which the Uniform Rules are in accord with pres-
ent Minnesota law.
2. Respects in which the Uniform Rules change the present
Minnesota law
3. Minnesota statutory law which should be repealed if the Uni-
form Rules are adopted.
4. Respects in which adoption of the Uniform Rules would
clarify Minnesota law
5. Respects in which the Uniform Rules and Minnesota law are
indifferent to each other.
1. Accord. The Uniform Rules agree with present Minnesota
practice in making judicial notice of the United States and Minne-
sota constitutions, general statutes, and decisions mandatory 104
Under both, judicial notice of private statutes, administrative regu-
lations and municipal ordinances is permissive.""' Also permissive is
104. See note 19 supra.
105. See notes 25 to 31 supra.
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judicial notice of facts generally known within the territorial juris-
diction of the court.'0 6 Under the Uniform Rule 10(1) both parties
must be afforded an opportunity to present information data; it is
believed that same -is true under present Minnesota law.10 7 In addi-
tion, the court may consider any pertinent source of information. 08
Neither under Uniform Rule 10(3) nor under Minnesota law may
the court take judicial notice unless it is convinced.10 9 All matters
of law must be determined by the court and not the jury. 0 The
Supreme Court has the power to review the trial court's determina-
tions as to judicial notice and to take judicial notice initially under
present Minnesota lawn" as well as under Uniform Rules 12(2)
and 12(3).
2. Change. Under Uniform Rule 9(1) judicial notice of the
constitutions, statutes and decisions of other states of the United
States is mandatory, whereas Minnesota has adopted the Uniform
Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act which makes judicial notice
-of such matters permissive.'- Also mandatory under Rule 9(1) is
judicial notice of specific facts universally known. Although there
seem to be no cases squarely in point, it is believed that at present
such judicial notice is permissive. Judicial notice of the law of other
countries is permissive under Uniform Rule 9(1) ; no such judicial
notice is now recognized in Minnesota.2' 3 Uniform Rule 12(4) re-
quires that, if the reviewing court takes judicial notice of a matter
not previously so noticed, reasonable opportunity to present infor-
mation shall be provided. Quaere, what types of judicial notice are
covered by this? However Rule 12(4) is construed, it will change
Minnesota law to some extent. Beyond what can be done in a peti-
tion for rehearing, there is no present provision for submitting infor-
mation to be a reviewing court pertinent to matters it has judicially
noticed.
3. Repeal. If the Uniform Rules should be adopted in Minne-
sota, sections 599.01 through 599.10 of the Minnesota statutes
should be repealed. All of these sections are either in conflict with
the Uniform Rules or are superseded thereby. Sections 599.01
106. See note 33 supra.
107. See note 81 supra.
108. See Uniform Rule 10(2) (a) and notes 83 to 87 supra.
109. See note 90 sura
110. Uniform Rule 10(4) is in accord with Minn. Stat. §§ 599.06 and
599.08 (1953). See notes 91-93 supra.
111. See note 102 supra.
112. Notes 21 and 22 supra. It must be borne in mind that permissivejudicial notice becomes mandatory if a request therefore be made, notice
given, and informational data is furnished the court
113. Notes 23 and 24 supra.
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through 599.03 deal with methods of proving foreign law. Of course,
even though foreign law be judicially noticed, it must be established
by the use of informational data. Rule 10(2) (a) permits the court
to use "any source of pertinent information." That clearly super-
sedes the more detailed provisions of sections 599.01-599.03. Sec-
tions 599.04-599.10 are the Uniform judicial Notice of Foreign
Law Act. The Uniform Rules, either explicitly or implicitly, cover
everything in that act and much more. Repeals by implication are
not favored, furthermore, it is confusing that statutes contain over-
lapping and redundant material. The same argument would seem
to require repeal of Minnesota statutes sections 544.20 (Judicial
Notice of Municipal Ordinances), 628.21 (private statutes), and
15.049 (administrative regulations) Such is not here suggested.
Those statutes do not conflict with the Uniform Rules. They do
overlap to some extent, but they also supplement the Uniform Rules
by spelling out in detail matters suggested in the rules.1 1 4 Those
statutes are not found in chapters dealing with evidence or judicial
notice as such. They are incidental to other subjects, and, it is be-
lieved, no confusion will result by their retention. It would be a futile
task for legislation to specify decisions rendered obsolete by the
Uniform Rules. Such matters must await determination in each
particular case.
4. Clarification. No clear and explicit distinction exists in the
Minnesota statutory or doctrinal law between mandatory and per-
missive judicial notice, such a distinction is clearly recognized by
Uniform Rule 9. Minnesota decisions do not recognize, in those
terms, the distinction between specific facts and propositions of
generalized information which is made by Uniform Rule 9(1). Such
a distinction would seem to be implicit in Minnesota law judicial
notice of propositions of generalized knowledge is probably manda-
tory in the sense that a court would be reversed, if in error, how-
ever, that such is true is made clear by Rule 9(1) Uniform Rule
9(2) (d) puts an end to any doubt regarding judicial notice of
matters capable of immediate and accurate determination. Many
cases would indicate that such is the Minnesota law, but that is
not absolutely clear. The writer has found no Minnesota authority,
either way, comparable to Rule 10(2) (b) restricting exclusionary
rules in connection with the sources of information to be considered.
Fundamental is the question whether evidence can be introduced in
114. For example, Uniform Rule 9(2) (a) refers to judicial notice of
"duly published regulations." Section 15.049 (Minn. Stat. 1953) incorporates
sections 15.045 to 15.049 which specify the method of publication n greater
detail.
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refutation of a matter judicially noticed. The Minnesota authorities
leave this question unanswered. Rule 11 settles it by establishing
the conclusive effect of judicial notice. Rule 12(1), dealing with
judicial notice in subsequent proceedings, probably states the
Minnesota law, although~it is not explicit.
5. The final conclusion is that the uniform rules have little effect
upon the large body of Minnesota precedent. The Uniform Rules
deal primarily with judicial notice as a matter of evidence law,
whereas the majority of decisions deal with generalized knowledge
as a phase of judicial reasoning.

